AO 91 (Rev. 11/11) Criminal Complaint

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Oregon

United States of America
v.

ESTEBAN PERALTA FRAGOZO

Defendant(s)

Case No. 6:26-mj-302

AMENDED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
BY TELEPHONE OR OTHER RELIABLE ELECTRONIC MEANS

I, the complainant in this case, state that the following is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

On or about the date(s) of January 2018 - Present in the county of Lane in the _____ District of Oregon, the defendant(s) violated:

Code Section	*Offense Description*
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)	Laundering of monetary instruments—sting provision
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)	Alien in possession of a firearm

This criminal complaint is based on these facts:

See attached affidavit of IRS-CI Special Agent Scott McGeachy

☑ Continued on the attached sheet.

By phone pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 4.1
Complainant's signature

Scott McGeachy, Special Agent, IRS-CI
Printed name and title

Attested to by the applicant in accordance with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 4.1 by telephone at 12:44 p.m. a.m./p.m.

Date: 11/04/2026

Amy E Potter
Judge's signature

City and state: Eugene, Oregon

Hon. Amy Potter, United States Magistrate Judge
Printed name and title

DISTRICT OF OREGON, ss: AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT McGEACHY

Affidavit in Support of an Amended Criminal Complaint

I, Scott McGeachy, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and state as follows:

Introduction and Agent Background

1. I am a Special Agent employed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Criminal Investigation, and have held this position for twenty-five years. I have successfully completed the 11-week Criminal Investigator Training Course at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and the 16-week Special Agent Basic Training course put on by the Internal Revenue Service. During this time, I have either conducted or been involved in investigations concerning Title 26 (Income Tax), Title 18 (Conspiracy and Money Laundering), and Title 31 (Bank Secrecy Act) violations by individuals involved in both legal and illegal occupations. I have written and/or directly been involved in writing over 400 search and/or seizure warrants and have participated in the execution of numerous federal search warrants involving criminal income tax charges, money laundering, narcotics violations, and other criminal activities during which evidence of criminal violations was seized. For the past eighteen years, I have predominantly worked investigations involving narcotics trafficking and money laundering.

2. I submit this affidavit in support of an amendedcomplaint charging Esteban Peralta **FRAGOZO**, Hispanic male, 5'9", 125 pounds, Date of Birth: **/**/1976 (hereinafter, "**FRAGOZO**") with violations of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(3), laundering of monetary instruments—sting provision and a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(g)(5), alien in possession of a firearm.

3. This affidavit is intended to show only that there is sufficient probable cause to support the amended complaint and does not set forth all of my knowledge about this matter. The facts set forth in this affidavit are based on my own personal knowledge, knowledge obtained from other individuals during my participation in this investigation, including other law enforcement officers, interviews, a review of records related to this investigation, communications with others who have knowledge of the events and circumstances described herein, and information gained through my training and experience.

Target Offenses

4. I believe there is probable cause to believe that **FRAGOZO** committed violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1956(a)(3), which prohibits conducting a financial transaction with property represented to be the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity with the intent to conceal and disguise the nature, source, location, ownership, and control of property believed to be proceeds of a specified unlawful activity. Drug trafficking is considered a specified unlawful activity under the statute.

5. I also believe there is probable cause to believe that **FRAGOZO** committed a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(g)(5), which provides that it shall be unlawful for any alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or except as provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(26))); to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

Statement of Probable Cause

6. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation (IRS CI) are investigating a Springfield, Oregon-based Money Service Business (MSB) called El Kaiman Western Wear (**El Kaiman**) operated by Esteban Peralta **FRAGOZO** (hereinafter, "**FRAGOZO**") in Springfield, Oregon. **FRAGOZO** is suspected of using **El Kaiman** to launder drug proceeds.

7. A query with Department of Homeland Security and a review of internal law enforcement databases has determined that **FRAGOZO** appears to be a Mexican national having no immigration records associated with lawful residence or citizenship in the United States. Investigators therefore believe he is unlawfully residing in the United States.

8. **El Kaiman** is located at 2132 Main Street, #5070, Springfield, Oregon 97477. El Kaiman Western Wear was initially formed with the Oregon Secretary of State on February 16, 2012, and cancelled on March 6, 2023. On March 6, 2023, "El Kaiman Western Wear LLC."[1] was formed with the Oregon Secretary of State with **FRAGOZO** listed as a Member and Juanita Romero Yslas listed as the Registered Agent and Member. I reviewed the Articles of Incorporation for El Kaiman Western Wear LLC. that show **FRAGOZO** and Juanita Romero Yslas as Members. **FRAGOZO** lists his residential address on the El Kaiman Western Wear LLC. Articles of Incorporation.

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[1] El Kaiman Western Wear LLC. is correctly notated with a period after the name.

9. On September 5, 2025, El Kaiman Western Wear (a third business bearing the similar name) was formed with the Oregon Secretary of State, which also shows to be currently active. The Authorized Representative is listed as **FRAGOZO** with an address at the 366 S. 42nd Place, Springfield, Oregon 97478 (hereinafter, "**FRAGOZO Residence")**. Based upon my review of the Oregon Secretary of State Corporation Division records, as of October 25, 2026, both El Kaiman Western Wear LLC. and El Kaiman Western Wear are active and list current business addresses matching **El Kaiman**. Based on the slight variation of the incorporation name of El Kaiman Western Wear LLC. and El Kaiman Western Wear and the fact they both depict the identical business address and business purpose, I believe these to be the identical business (hereinafter collectively, "**El Kaiman**"). At this time, I don't know why **FRAGOZO** has formed two active companies with a slight name variation; however, I believe these are the same store.

10. **El Kaiman** advertises clothing for sale as well as its ability to transmit money internationally for a fee. Based upon my training and experience, money service storefront locations like **El Kaiman** are agents of large corporate MSBs such as Intermex, Barri, Viamericas and Ria. Such agents typically have a cash-to-wire model, where they accept cash from customers and use corporate MSB wire remittance platforms to transfer the funds on behalf of customers to locations within the United States and internationally to Mexico, Honduras, and other countries.

11. Instead of smuggling drug proceeds by physically transporting them across the U.S. border, drug sellers are often instructed by their bosses to take proceeds of their drug sales to a local MSB such as **El Kaiman** to transmit to a source of supply to pay for the drugs.

Traffickers also use MSBs, like **El Kaiman**, to transmit money earned from selling drugs to their families. The drug traffickers and/or MSB agents in the U.S.—known as complicit MSB operators—often manipulate the wire remittance requirements by falsifying information. Records obtained from **El Kaiman** via subpoenas and undercover contacts reveal the use of false sender names and addresses, presumably to avoid the mandatory record-keeping requirements and conceal the nature of illegal activity generating the wired funds.

12. The investigation into **El Kaiman** was initiated following multiple DEA investigations that identified individuals involved in drug trafficking using **El Kaiman** to wire purported drug proceeds. This affidavit will outline some of these drug investigations including **FRAGOZO's** assistance in laundering drug proceeds for the drug traffickers.

A. Background of FINCEN/BSA Regulations for Money Service Business and their Agents

13. Based on my training and experience, I am aware of the following:

14. The Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA") is codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313-5326. The definition of a financial institution under the statute, 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(R), includes "a licensed sender of money or any other person who engages as a business in the transmission of funds[.]" Under the relevant federal regulations, some financial institutions can also be defined as a "money services business" ("MSBs"), which include "money transmitters." *See* 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(t)(3) (including a "money services business" in the definition of "financial institution"); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5) (including "money transmitters" in the definition of "money services business").

15. Any person who owns or controls an MSB is responsible for registering, and periodically re-registering, the business with FinCEN. *See* 31 U.S.C. § 5330(a); *see also* 31 C.F.R. 1022.380. A person who owns or controls a money services business solely because that person serves as an agent of another money services business, is not required to register. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.100(ff), 1022.380(a)(3). For a money transmitter registered with FinCEN, 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(C) criminalizes money transmitting businesses that "involve . . . the transportation or transmission of funds that are known to the defendant to have been derived from a criminal offense or are intended to be used to promote or support unlawful activity."

16. Under the BSA, all non-exempt financial institutions are required to "establish anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism programs, including at a minimum—(A) the development of internal policies, procedures, and controls; (B) the designation of a compliance officer" who is responsible for assuring that the business complies with all BSA requirements; "(C) an ongoing employee training program; and (D) an independent audit function to test programs." 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1).

17. The BSA regulations also contain certain recordkeeping requirements, including the requirement for "nonbank financial institutions" such as MSBs to keep the following information with respect to a transmittal of funds in the amount of $3,000 or more: the name and address of the transmitter; any payment instructions received from the transmitter; and the name, address, and account number of the recipient, if received. 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.410(e)(1). Moreover, the regulations set forth additional requirements regarding obtaining and/or retaining identification documents and tax identification numbers for verification of transmitters and recipients for transmittal or receipt of funds in the amount of $3,000 or more. 31 C.F.R.

§§ 1010.410(e)(2)-(3). BSA regulations further require financial institutions, including MSBs, to file reports concerning suspicious transactions ("SARs") for transactions of $2,000 or more. 31 C.F.R. § 1022.320.

B. The Nature of Wire Remittances at an MSB

18. A typical wire transaction begins when a customer (sender) visits a local storefront MSB agent with cash for the purpose of sending the money to a receiver (beneficiary). The MSB agent is either connected to their corporate MSB via a computer terminal or by a direct telephonic connection inside the store. The customer provides their own name, address, and telephone number. The customer also provides the name of the receiver (beneficiary) of the wire remittance, as well as the receiver's city, state, and country. The customer provides this information either directly to an employee at the MSB agent location for the employee to enter it into the corporate MSB computer system or the customer uses a telephone at the sending agent location to speak directly with an operator who works for the corporate MSB; either way the same result is achieved.

19. After the information is collected, the sender provides cash to the local MSB agent in the amount to be transferred plus a fee charged by the corporate MSB to facilitate the transaction. The fee for a wire remittance is approximately $10.00 to $30.00 depending on the amount of the transfer (for example, the MSB company known as Intermex charges approximately $30.00 on a $2,000 transfer, and $20.00 on a $1,000 transfer). The local MSB agent then prepares and provides to the customer a receipt containing all the transaction information including the amount of the transaction, the date and time the remittance was sent, and a unique transaction number sometimes called an MTCN (Money Transfer Control

Number). The customer provides this MTCN number to the intended beneficiary, which is required for the beneficiary to pick up the funds at the wire remittance destination location. Once the beneficiary receives the MTCN from the sender, they visit their own MSB agent, present their identification and the MTCN, and obtain the transmitted cash.

20. Another way a local MSB transmits a wire remittance is directly to a recipient's bank account. The sender provides the local MSB with a bank account number and routing number for the recipient. Wire remittances transmitted to a bank account in Mexico are often shown as being processed through Distrito Federal, Mexico, but the recipient may reside anywhere in Mexico, and they can access the transmitted funds anywhere by using a debit card for the account.

21. Local MSB agents must provide the corporate MSB with the cash they have collected from conducting wire remittances for customers. MSB agents typically accomplish this by making large cash deposits into a local corporate bank account maintained by the parent MSB. The required frequency of the cash deposits to the corporate MSB varies among different companies but typically occurs every few days.

C. Summary of El Kaiman Wire Transmissions

22. Aggregate data from law enforcement financial databases, subpoenaed documents, and surveillance show that **El Kaiman** has served as an agent for several MSB services and is currently an agent for Barri, Intercambio, Intermex, Viamericas, Ria, and Maxi.

23. **El Kaiman** appears to have been in business since 2012; however, the name has slightly changed over the years. Analysis of the wire transfer data identified multiple suspected money laundering red flags present in **El Kaiman's** wire activity going back at least as far as

2018, indicating that **El Kaiman** has been operating as a complicit MSB. Those red flags include, but are not limited to:

- The heavy concentration of transfers being sent to drug source states (Mexico and Honduras);
- Many of the transfers are just below the Corporate MSB thresholds that require forms of ID from the sender;
- Lack of commonalities or apparent familial ties between the sender and receiver; and
- Recipients of the some of the wires are also receiving wires from several other people throughout the U.S.

24. Federal grand jury subpoenas were issued to Barri, Intermex, Intercambio, Viamericas, Ria, and Maxi for records and transaction data relating to authorized agent **El Kaiman**. The request covered transactions conducted during January 2018 through July 2026. The goal of this analysis was to derive an estimated value of funds wired through **El Kaiman** that were sourced from suspected illegal activity.

25. Analysis of the MSB data provided shows that during the approximately eight-and-a-half-year period reviewed, **El Kaiman** conducted 179,874 wire transfers for a total value of $93,259,139.97 (USD). The breakdown by each MSB is shown in Chart 1 below:

All Completed Transactions Conducted Through El Kaiman							
Jan 2018 - July 2026	Barri	Intercambio	Intermex	Viamericas	Ria	Maxi	Total
Total Wires Sent	6,295	53,885	57,445	22,386	698	39,165	179,874
Total USD Sent	3,564,454.85	27,669,122.47	30,313,968.70	11,857,802.65	292,144.78	19,561,646.52	$ 93,259,139.97

26. Mexico remains the dominant conduit for most illegal drugs entering the U.S. According to the 2025 DEA National Drug Threat Assessment, of the top Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), the Sinaloa Cartel and Cartel Jalisco New Generation (CJNG), which splintered off from Sinaloa in 2010, continue to pose the most significant drug threat to the U.S.[2] These TCOs have strongholds along Mexico's Pacific coast, exercising significant territorial influence in parts of the country near drug production hubs and along drug-trafficking routes as depicted in Figure 1 below.



[2] U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, *2025 National Drug Threat Assessment*, May 2025, at page 5-10, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025NationalDrugThreatAssessment.pdf




Figure 1

27. Analysis of El Kaiman's wire transfers identified that $70,773,244.53 (76%) went to Mexico, with the states known as drug trafficking hubs including Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Sinaloa, and Distrito Federal having received a large portion of those funds.

28. Narcotics investigators in Oregon have seen a dramatic increase in drug trafficking activity conducted by Honduran nationals. Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are increasingly using Hondurans to distribute bulk amounts of fentanyl and other drugs in major metropolitan cities. Honduran nationals come into the U.S. and will often report to Oakland, California, prior to being dispatched by the DTOs to the Portland metro area and elsewhere for their drug trafficking assignments.[3] Due to geographic limitations, Honduran drug

[3] For more information on the Honduran connection to U.S. drug trafficking, see this 2023 article from the San Francisco Chronicle.

traffickers may lack the ability to bulk cash smuggle drug proceeds from states such as Oregon through Mexico down to Honduras. Instead, they use MSBs to help conceal their illegal activities. Analysis of the southbound transfers identified that $1,480,728.59 (2%), of the total wire transfers sent from **El Kaiman** went to Honduras.

29. Remittances from the U.S. to Mexico have increased steadily since the COVID-19 pandemic. With the border closing for a twenty-month period ending in late 2021, wire remittances were used more frequently by drug dealers as a desirable, low-risk method for moving illicit proceeds generated in the U.S. Mexican nationals working in the U.S., both documented and undocumented, often use the services of local MSB agents to send money to their families in Mexico. This is often because they do not have access to traditional financial services, like those offered by banks. These legitimate customers usually visit the MSB once or twice per month, after they are paid from their jobs, and send a small portion of their paycheck back to Mexico. While the total remittances to Mexico reached a record $63.3 billion in 2023, the average amount of each wire transfer has stayed consistent at around $393.[4]

30. To better identify illicit transactions as opposed to legitimate subsistence payments, money laundering investigators often apply filters to the transaction data. The **El Kaiman** wire transactions included in Chart 2 were filtered by eliminating all wire transfers below $500. The designated dollar threshold amount of $500 and greater was specifically designed to limit the dataset to only those money transfers with certain characteristics that

[4] https://apnews.com/article/mexico-remittances-record-money-migrants-275a49302e840fdaa8060d5cab9c7a24

dramatically increase the likelihood of being proceeds of illegal activity and reasonably remove non-criminal proceeds transactions conducted by members of the local community.

31. The **El Kaiman** wire transactions in Chart 2 were further filtered to only include transactions of $500 or more sent to areas in Mexico and Honduras associated with drug cartels.

Chart 2:

Filtered Transactions (≥$500) Conducted Through El Kaiman January 2018 - July 2026		
	Total Wires Sent	63,187
	Total Amount Sent	$ 71,458,073.87
	Total Amount sent to Honduras and Mexico	**$ 55,876,922.25**
	Honduras	865,018.75
	Guerrero, Mexico	1,116,155.25
	Oaxaca, Mexico	10,224,129.82
	Sinaloa, Mexico	722,191.71
	Jalisco, Mexico	7,811,164.20
	Michoacan, Mexico	4,857,747.85
	Nayarit, Mexico	1,538,901.49
	Distrito Federal, Mexico	7,016,279.32
	Total sent to HN and specified states MX	**$ 34,151,588.39**

32. Through a review of MSB records, I know that on some occasions an individual would enter **El Kaiman** and remit monies to both Honduras and Mexican DTO regions during the same visit. Based on my training and experience, a single individual simultaneously remitting money to both Mexico and Honduras is highly suspicious because non-criminal migrant earnings are commonly remitted to family members typically residing in only one country, whereas remittances to these two countries as part of a single visit to an MSB is more indicative of a drug

dealer sending proceeds to drug cartels and sending some money home to family. I also noticed a number of **El Kaiman** transactions over $500 in which there was a lack of commonality between the remitter and recipient surnames in remittances sent to Mexico, which is another indicator of possible money laundering as these individuals are less likely to be related as family.

33. Based on the following factors, I believe the wire remittances depicted in Chart 2 above are indicative of widespread drug activity in the Eugene/Springfield metropolitan area and the use of **El Kaiman** to launder suspected drug proceeds:

i) the size of the wire remittances ($500 or more);

ii) the high volume of remittances from Springfield, Oregon to areas in Mexico and Honduras associated with drug cartels;

iii) a controlled buy of methamphetamine and surveillance of drug traffickers transmitting money through **El Kaiman** in Springfield, Oregon (see below);

iv) A review of wire remittances from **El Kaiman** depicting specific individuals transmitting money to both Honduras and Mexico (see below); and

v) A review of wire remittances depicting individuals remitting money with a lack of commonality between the sender and recipient name and/or surname.

34. Based on the information described above, analysis of MSB transaction data and subpoenaed bank records, and my training and experience in money laundering, as shown in Chart 2, I estimate that during the time period between January 2018 and July 2026, **El Kaiman** transmitted $34,151,588 in suspected drug proceeds from Springfield, Oregon to the drug trafficking corridors in Mexico and Honduras.

D. Anti-Money Laundering Training and Certification of FRAGOZO

35. Part of the process to become an agent for a licensed MSB is that the owner and/or employees are required to obtain anti-money laundering and BSA training from the parent MSB companies. Based on surveillance, **FRAGOZO** appears to be the primary employee responsible for opening the store each day and typically departs in the afternoon after an employee arrives at the business. Based on a review of subpoena documents including anti-money laundering certifications, **FRAGOZO** appears to be the owner and manager of **El Kaiman**.

36. I reviewed Barri Money Services, Intercambio Express, Ria Money Transfer, Intermex, and Viamericas responsive data from subpoenaed documents. Based upon my review of Barri Money Services documents, **FRAGOZO** completed an AML Training Certificate of Completion for Barri Money Services for 2023, 2024 and 2025. I reviewed an Intercambio Express Certificate of Completion for Esteban Peralta (**FRAGOZO**) from Intercambio Express, noting the successful completion of the BSA/AML Antifraud Compliance Training 2024, dated August 22, 2024. Intercambio Express records show **El Kaiman**'s designated Compliance Officer as Esteban **FRAGOZO** who has the following responsibilities (the Compliance Officer Job Responsibilities were provided in both English and Spanish):[5]

- Review AML Policies and Procedures at least annually
- Provide initial AML training for new employees

[5] A follow-up subpoena listed the Intercambio Express Compliance Officer for 2025 as Sandra Hernandez Vargas with an email address of eperalta.98@gmail.com. I believe it's likely the email address belongs to **FRAGOZO** based upon "e" for Esteban's first name and "Peralta" for **FRAGOZO's** first surname.

- Ensure employees receive ongoing AML training at least once a year
- Monitor daily transactions and identify any unusual transactions
- Ensure all employees understand AML Policies and Procedures
- Ensure Independent AML Compliance Program Review is conducted periodically and any corrective actions are implemented
- Ensure all Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) and Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) are properly and timely completed before filing them with FinCEN's e-filing system.

37. I reviewed a Viamericas Acknowledgement of Training in Money Order Anti-Money Laundering Program Policies and Procedures, which **FRAGOZO** electronically signed and dated August 8, 2022, noting **El Kaiman** will provide compliance training, including a review of the Money Orders Product Specific Policies to all employees once a year. The document further stated **El Kaiman** will verify that the information entered in the Viamericas system is identical to the information from a customer identification card. This requirement applies for Money Order purchases of $1,000 or more.

38. I also reviewed an Intermex Training Certificate for Esteban Peralta (**FRAGOZO**), which noted an Anti-Money Laundering Training Certificate dated May 28, 2025.

39. Based on my review of corporate MSB Anti-Money Laundering guidelines as well as the fact **El Kaiman** appears to have been in the money transfer business since 2012, I believe **FRAGOZO** has had extensive training and experience as it relates to maintaining and complying with the BSA Guidelines and is aware of the penalties for knowingly violating the

Bank Secrecy Act in Title 31, United States Code, Sections 5318 and 5322. As set forth below, **FRAGOZO** and his **El Kaiman** MSB have violated BSA and AML rules and regulations designed to prevent money laundering on multiple occasions. To date, based upon Investigators' research, **FRAGOZO** has never filed a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) on any of the transactions conducted or attempted at **El Kaiman**.

E. DEA Investigation of Diaz-Alcantar and Alvarado-Gonzalez

40. I spoke with DEA TFO Kristofer Strubel regarding an investigation into Alejandra Diaz-Alcantar (Diaz-Alcantar) and Juan Alberto Alvarado-Gonzalez (Alvarado-Gonzalez) and reviewed the DEA investigation report and criminal complaint 25-mj-00338-AP, which contain the following details.

41. On November 6, 2025, Investigators conducted surveillance and observed Alvarado-Gonzalez and Diaz-Alcantar enter **El Kaiman** for approximately fifteen minutes prior to departing with no visible merchandise. On November 10, 2025, at approximately 10:15 a.m., an OSP Trooper and his certified K-9 initiated a traffic stop on I-5 of a white Chevrolet truck with Alvarado-Gonzalez driving and Diaz-Alcantar as a passenger.


42. Alvarado-Gonzalez was questioned outside of the vehicle and told the OSP Trooper there was methamphetamine in the backseat of the vehicle. Alvarado-Gonzalez stated that Diaz-Alcantar had arranged the pickup with the source of supply in Los Angeles, California. The OSP Trooper deployed his K9 to conduct a free air sniff around the vehicle. The K9 alerted to controlled substances coming from the white Chevrolet truck. After obtaining a search warrant, Investigators found two duffel bags under the rear passenger seat containing 56 plastic bags and bindles of suspected methamphetamine weighing approximately 72 pounds.


72 Pounds of Methamphetamine Seized from Chevrolet Truck



43. Inside the white Chevrolet truck were two wire remittance slips from **El Kaiman**. One wire remittance slip was dated November 5, 2025, for $310 transmitted by **El Kaiman** to Jalisco, Mexico (another well-known drug cartel location in Mexico). The second wire remittance slip was transmitted by **El Kaiman** on November 6, 2025, for $1,300 destined to Honduras. Based upon my training and experience as well as the facts in this investigation, I believe that both of these wire transfers involved drug proceeds sent through **El Kaiman** to Mexico and Honduras.

Two Wire Remittance Slips Seized from Chevrolet Truck





44. Both Alvarado-Gonzalez and Diaz-Alcantar have pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute the methamphetamine based on the facts set forth above.

F. Confidential Informant (CI) Meets with FRAGOZO

45. As part of this investigation, Investigators have used information provided by a Confidential Informant (hereinafter, "CI") who has provided reliable and actionable information to law enforcement in exchange for monetary compensation and immigration benefits since June

2015. No promises or guarantees have been made by Investigators in order to gain the CI's cooperation. The CI has provided information that led to arrests and seizure of contraband. The CI has been convicted once for possession of controlled substances and has admitted to having an extensive history of drug trafficking including first-hand knowledge of marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, fentanyl, and heroin distribution. Additionally, the CI has assisted law enforcement with money laundering investigations, including picking up and delivering bulk U.S. currency for known Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO) and conducting no fewer than six investigations related to MSBs that involve wire transfers of bulk U.S. currency on behalf of known TCO's using fictitious sender and recipient information. The CI is familiar with complicit MSBs and their modus operandi including structuring bulk currency, the use of fictitious sender names/addresses and laundering of drug proceeds through MSBs. I believe the information the CI has provided to be credible and reliable, to the extent it has been corroborated by investigators as detailed below because of the following: (1) the CI's ability to conduct recorded money laundering related transactions with **FRAGOZO** and (2) corroborative information obtained from other investigations including photographs of wire remittance slips and the review of subpoenaed documents.

46. As set forth below, I believe the interactions between the CI and **FRAGOZO** provide probable cause to believe that **FRAGOZO** is involved in (1) money laundering-related crimes; (2) alien in possession of a firearm; and (3) murder for hire.

i. May 20, 2026 CI Operation at El Kaiman

47. On May 20, 2026, the CI met with **FRAGOZO** at **El Kaiman** pursuant to an undercover operation. The CI, who is a Hispanic male, was wearing a recording device and the

undercover operation took place in Spanish. Investigators have determined that **FRAGOZO** is fluent in Spanish. A preliminary transcript of the undercover meeting has been completed. Throughout this affidavit, at times the transcript will show (UI), which has been translated as unintelligible. A third-party service has completed the transcript and the reasons portions of the transcript have not been translated is due to a variety of factors including background noise, unable to hear the recording, individuals speaking over each other, and broken translations. Prior to the undercover operation, Investigators provided the CI with a copy of a government AI-generated Mexican Consular identification card printed on unlaminated paper which depicted a female with the name of Claudia E.R.B.[6]

48. On May 20, 2026, at approximately 8:12 a.m., Investigators using video surveillance in the area of **El Kaiman**, observed the **Mercedes Benz** registered to **FRAGOZO** arrive and park in front of **El Kaiman**. An individual matching the physical characteristics of **FRAGOZO** exited from the **Mercedes Benz**, unlocked the front door, and entered **El Kaiman**.

49. During the undercover contact, the CI told **FRAGOZO** his cousin referred the CI to **El Kaiman** and had previously lived in the area. The CI described his cousin as an individual that earned a lot of money (dough). CI told **FRAGOZO** he wished to transmit money to Honduras. The CI provided a phone number for the wire remittance of (503) XXX-6563.[7] **FRAGOZO** inquired how much money in total the CI wanted to send. The CI informed

[6] While this is an AI-generated photograph and name, Investigators have anonymized the full name due to other active, ongoing investigations.

[7] The phone number is provided by the CI during later undercover operations, which would automatically bring up the information for Claudia E.R.B., so the CI does not have to produce the identification each time he enters El Kaiman.

FRAGOZO, in general, he wanted to transmit $16,500 to help get an individual across the border.

50. During the undercover operation, the CI provided the Mexican Consular identification card with the initials Claudia E.R.B. to **FRAGOZO** as his form of identification, along with $1,000 in cash to transmit to Honduras. **FRAGOZO** accepted the Mexican Consular identification card from the CI and processed the $1,000 wire remittance even though the CI is male and the card provided depicted a photograph and name of a female. When processing this wire transfer, **FRAGOZO** input the sender address incorrectly. The listed address on the card was XXXXX NE Meadow Park Court, Vancouver, Washington 98684. However, **FRAGOZO** typed the address as Meadow Northeast, Vancouver, Washington and failed to type in the digits. I know that manipulating sender names and addresses on wire remittances is common among complicit MSB agents such as **FRAGOZO** to obfuscate the paper trial for wire transfers. I believe that **FRAGOZO** intentionally input the incorrect address as "Meadow Northeast", which is not close to the address depicted on the identification card of XXXXX NE Meadow Park Court.

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
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51. Below is a receipt (redacted by law enforcement) for the $1,000 wire transfer.



Remitente / Sender

[redacted]
MEADOW NORTHEAST
VANCOUVER, WASHINGTON 98664
Teléfono / Phone: [redacted]

Destinatario / Recipient

[redacted]
HONDURAS

Lugar de Pago / Location of Payment

Pagador / Payer: BANCO ATLANTIDA
Ciudad / City: TEGUCIGALPA
Estado / State: FRANCISCO MORAZAN

GIRO / WIRE TRANSFER

Cantidad de Envio / Transfer Amount:	$ 980.20 USD
Cargos por Envio / Transf. Fees-w Cash:	$ 10.00 USD
Impuestos de Envio (Estatal) / Transfer Tax (State):	$ 0.00 USD
Impuestos de Envio (Federal) / Transfer Tax (Federal):	$ 9.80 USD
Descuento / Discount Amount:	$ 0.00 USD
Total a pagar / Total Due:	$ 1,000.00 USD
Tipo de Cambio / Exchange Rate:	26.6282
Total al	$ 26,100.96 HNL

ii. May 21, 2026

52. On May 21, 2026, at approximately 7:48 a.m., using video surveillance in the area of **El Kaiman**, Investigators observed the **Mercedes Benz** registered to **FRAGOZO** arrive and park in front of **El Kaiman**. An individual matching the physical characteristics of **FRAGOZO** exited the **Mercedes Benz**, unlocked the front door of **El Kaiman**, and entered **El Kaiman**.

53. At approximately 9:50 a.m., the CI met with **FRAGOZO** inside of **El Kaiman**. The CI was wearing a recording device, and the undercover operation took place in Spanish. A preliminary transcript has been completed of the undercover operation from Spanish to English. During the undercover meeting, the CI provided a copy of another government AI-generated Mexican Consular identification card with initials Elisa A.C.B. to **FRAGOZO** as his form of

identification, along with $1,000 to transmit to Honduras. The Mexican Consular identification portrayed a photograph of a woman different from the false ID used the previous day, with the different name of Elisa A.C.B. For the second straight day, **FRAGOZO** accepted this blatantly false ID and again incorrectly input the sender address from the Mexican Consular identification card on the Intermex wire remittance. The address on the Mexico Consular identification card displayed XXX W. Cedar Heights Road, Vancouver, Washington yet **FRAGOZO** input the address as Meadow Northeast, Vancouver, Washington, consistent with the actions of a complicit MSB owner/operator. The CI mentioned the purpose of the wire remittance was to pay for a "coyote".[8]

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[8] A coyote is a term for a person that helps smuggle undocumented immigrants across the border.



intermex
INTERNATIONAL MONEY EXPRESS

OR-0708 - EL KAIMAN WESTERN WEAR
(541) 726-9273
2132 MAIN ST.
SPRINGFIELD, OREGON 97477

Giro / Wire

OR-0708 - 4962
5/21/2026 9:55 AM
Procesado por / Rep: ELKAIMAN

Remitente / Sender

[redacted]
MEADOW NORTHEAST
VANCOUVER, WASHINGTON 98664
Teléfono / Phone: [redacted]

Destinatario / Recipient

[redacted]
HONDURAS

Lugar de Pago / Location of Payment

Pagador / Payer: BANCO ATLANTIDA
Ciudad / City: TEGUCIGALPA
Estado / State: FRANCISCO MORAZAN

GIRO / WIRE TRANSFER

Cantidad de Envío / Transfer Amount:	$ 980.20 USD
Cargos por Envío / Transf. Fees-w Cash:	$ 10.00 USD
Impuestos de Envío (Estatal) / Transfer Tax (State):	$ 0.00 USD
Impuestos de Envío (Federal) / Transfer Tax (Federal):	$ 9.80 USD
Descuento / Discount Amount:	$ 0.00 USD
Total a pagar / Total Due:	$ 1,000.00 USD
Tipo de Cambio / Exchange Rate:	26.6138
Total al Destinatario / Total to Recipient:	$ 26,116.25 HNL
Fecha Disponible / Date Available:	05/21/2026

GIRO / WIRE TRANSFER

Cantidad de Envío / Transfer Amount:	$ 980.20 USD
Cargos por Envío / Transf. Fees-w Cash:	$ 10.00 USD
Impuestos de Envío (Estatal) / Transfer Tax (State):	$ 0.00 USD
Impuestos de Envío (Federal) / Transfer Tax (Federal):	$ 9.80 USD
Descuento / Discount Amount:	$ 0.00 USD
Total a pagar / Total Due:	$ 1,000.00 USD
Tipo de Cambio / Exchange Rate:	26.6138
Total al Destinatario / Total	$ 26,116.25 HNL

iii. May 22, 2026

54. On May 22, 2026 at approximately 7:49 a.m., using video surveillance in the area of **El Kaiman**, Investigators observed **Mercedes Benz** registered to **FRAGOZO**, arrive and park in front of **El Kaiman**. **FRAGOZO** unlocked the front door of **El Kaiman** and entered the business.

55. At approximately 9:51 a.m., the CI met with **FRAGOZO** inside of **El Kaiman**. The CI was wearing a recording device, and the undercover operation took place in Spanish. A preliminary transcript has been completed of the undercover operation from Spanish to English. The CI informed **FRAGOZO** there was a problem with the two wire remittances transmitted the prior days and requested **FRAGOZO** cancel the wire remittances.[9] **FRAGOZO** told CI the funds would be available for pick up in a couple of days.

iv. May 31, 2026

56. On May 31, 2026, using video surveillance in the area of **El Kaiman**, Investigators observed the **Mercedes Benz** arrive and park in front of **El Kaiman**. An individual matching the physical characteristics of **FRAGOZO** exited from the **Mercedes Benz**, unlocked the front door of **El Kaiman**, and entered the business.

57. At approximately 8:56 a.m., the CI met with **FRAGOZO** inside of **El Kaiman**. The CI was wearing a recording device, and the undercover operation took place in Spanish. A preliminary transcript has been completed of the undercover operation from Spanish to English.

58. The CI inquired if he could resend the monies cancelled the prior week. **FRAGOZO** agreed to wire $1,000. **FRAGOZO** and the CI agreed to use the female sender's name previously provided (Claudia E.R.B.) during the undercover contact on May 20, 2026.

[9] The issue with the two wire remittances was due to an error in the corporate MSB's internal processing procedure; the recipient names did not get programmed into the MSB's computer system. This precluded investigators from collecting the money from the two wire remittances sent on May 20, 2026 and May 21, 2026. Thus, investigators directed the CI to return to **El Kaiman** to cancel the two wire remittances, collect the money, and resend the monies at a later date once the recipient names were programmed into the corporate MSB's computers.

This $1,000 transaction was successful. CI stated he would leave the remaining $1,000 with **FRAGOZO** to send a couple of days later. The CI inquired about transferring larger sums of cash and would be willing to pay a commission of 10% or 20%. **FRAGOZO** stated he would think about it, but he would not commit to it.

v. June 11, 2026 - The CI Tells FRAGOZO He is a Drug Dealer

59. On June 11, 2026, Investigators observed a black GMC pickup bearing OR/280PGW registered to Cristian Esteban Peralta Romero parked in front of **El Kaiman**. Investigators observed **FRAGOZO** exit from the GMC pickup that morning and opened the front door of **El Kaiman**.

60. During the undercover operation on June 11, 2026, the CI was wearing a recording device, and the undercover operation took place in Spanish. A preliminary transcript has been completed of the undercover operation from Spanish to English.

61. During this undercover contact, CI informed **FRAGOZO** that he sold methamphetamine as his source of money.

> **CI**: No, I trust you, well you know, you already know, **I sell meth, I sell everything** [bolded for emphasis].
> **FRAGOZO**: Whatever you sell.
> **CI**: Then yes, um, fuck it but I sell, I sell my things, and that's mine.

62. Near the end of the undercover contact, **FRAGOZO** describes a contact with an individual from Jalisco, Mexico who was being followed by law enforcement. The CI states again that they sold "aguita", which I know is common slang for methamphetamine.

> **FRAGOZO**: There was a dude who came here, maybe 5 years ago. Maybe you met him, a fucking dude very the fucker, from Jalisco. That fucker, I'm not an officer, but you can tell too. **And he had his job, same like** you and…But he brought his Brother send this for me, $3,000, you can send it, but (UI) with the information…..But I was

> aware that this buddy, was followed, and he was followed. One day I told him, take care buddy. Why? Because you park and right away a car goes after you. I saw it, I mean, I saw. He'd leave, and the car, I think they brought it. That's why buddy, take care…..The point man, that fucker got screwed over. He was betrayed, and you know by whom? His woman.
> **CI**: Yours is your and what I do is mine. **See. I'm gonna tell you. I sell, I sell aguita, I'm not gonna sell to, there for a fucker** [bolded for emphasis]. I'm not gonna take them and go someone asked me to bring these. I do it, but I have my people. And people we know for years, not just now.

63. The CI inquired if **FRAGOZO** would transmit additional money for the CI. **FRAGOZO** stated he would have issues transmitting wire remittances over the next couple of days because somebody needs to sign for the wire remittances. The CI stated he could pre-sign the wire remittances and **FRAGOZO** said he didn't want to do that now. The CI had previously provided **FRAGOZO** monies that had been cancelled on May 22, 2026. Thus **FRAGOZO** was already in possession of $980.00 in cash and transmitted $960.40 to Honduras on behalf of the CI using previously provided information, including the false ID for Elisa A.C.B.

64. During the undercover contact on June 11, 2026, the CI informed **FRAGOZO** that he was involved in drug trafficking "I sell meth, I sell everything". Later in the contact, CI tells **FRAGOZO** "I sell aguita". Thus, I believe **FRAGOZO** knowingly accepted drug proceeds and laundered the money through **El Kaiman** by executing the $960.40 wire remittance with the listed sender of Elisa A.C.B, and using an obviously false ID to conceal the nature of the transaction.

vi. July 8, 2026

65. On July 8, 2026, CI met with **FRAGOZO** at **El Kaiman**. The CI was wearing a recording device, and the undercover operation took place in Spanish. A preliminary transcript

has been completed of the undercover operation from Spanish to English. During the undercover contact, **FRAGOZO** expressed reluctance to transmit money for the CI due to recent law enforcement activity at a neighboring MSB called El Rincon.[10]

> **FRAGOZO**: Dude, oh that I wanted to tell you (UI) I will no longer be able to do wire transfers to (UI). They busted a buddy here man and I do not want that to happen to me. Just to make some fucking cents.
> **CI**: But and how's that?
> **FRAGOZO**: El Rincon Mexicano….They are working them hard now, they already closed their store, for the same thing, for (UI) fucking details like that.
> **CI**: Rincon Mexicano
> **FRAGOZO**: I don't want to bring, I don't want to get in trouble. Forgive me man, you ca-you can cancel my credit.
> **CI**: No, no, no al-all good. Maybe he sent massive amounts or who know what.
> **FRAGOZO**: I don't know what happened, but, did you not hear? It's been two, two I thought many people knew. Right now they have, have them in, in, in , well I don't know if he's locked up or they gave him shackles or something, because the investigation. Supposedly the FBI showed up there.
> **CI**: No, but that's a whole other problem, no, that's a whole other thing, man.
> **FRAGOZO**: And well you are cool man, but…I can't….and it's better to be upfront man, no, I can't do this anymore. Do you understand me?
> **CI**: But like this, well who knows what they were up to.
> **FRAGOZO**: I don't know what.
> **CI**: Now that is something else.
> **FRAGOZO**: I know man, but they're (UI) I don't want them to land here (UI) investigations and…For real, I'd rather be broke, but outside man, outside.

66. The CI provided **FRAGOZO** with one of the two false identifications previously provided using the name Claudia E.R.B. **FRAGOZO** told the CI it would cost $1,020 to transmit $1,000. Despite telling the CI he did not want to continue wiring money for him, **FRAGOZO** nevertheless proceeded to successfully process the wire transaction, as shown below, after the CI had told him he was a drug dealer.

[10] I am unaware if there was any law enforcement activity at El Rincon.



intermex
INTERNATIONAL MONEY EXPRESS

OR-0708 - EL KAIMAN WESTERN WEAR
(541) 726-9273
2132 MAIN ST.
SPRINGFIELD, OREGON 97477

Giro / Wire
OR-0708 - 6069
7/8/2026 10:04 AM
Procesado por / Rep: ELKAIMAN

Remitente / Sender
C[redacted] E[redacted] R[redacted] B[redacted]
MEADOW NORTHEAST
VANCOUVER, WASHINGTON 98664
Teléfono / Phone: [redacted]

Destinatario / Recipient
R[redacted] O[redacted] G[redacted]
MEXICO

Lugar de Pago / Location of Payment
Pagador / Payer: ELEKTRA
Ciudad / City: MORELIA
Estado / State: MICHOACAN

GIRO / WIRE TRANSFER

Cantidad de Envío / Transfer Amount:	$1,000.00 USD
Cargos por Envío / Transf. Fees-w Cash:	$10.00 USD
Impuestos de Envío (Estatal) / Transfer Tax (State):	$0.00 USD
Impuestos de Envío (Federal) / Transfer Tax (Federal):	$10.00 USD
Descuento / Discount Amount:	$0.00 USD
Total a pagar / Total Due:	**$1,020.00 USD**
Tipo de Cambio / Exchange Rate:	17.6600
Total al Destinatario / Total to Recipient:	**$17,660.00 MXN**
Fecha Disponible / Date Available:	**07/08/2026**

CLAVE / PIN NUMBER
N027500670

Lugar de Cobro / Payment Place Name
EKT MORELIA PEDREGAL / O Cualquier Sucursal del Pagador / Or Any Payer Branch

Dirección de Cobro / Payment

vii. September 29, 2026 (Morning)

67. On September 29, 2026, the CI met with **FRAGOZO** at **El Kaiman**. **FRAGOZO** had contacted the CI and requested the CI return to **El Kaiman** to provide a copy of one of the false identifications previously used to transmit wires, because the parent MSB was requesting the identification. The CI was wearing a recording device, and the undercover operation took place in Spanish. A preliminary transcript has been completed of the undercover operation from Spanish to English.

68. During the undercover contact on September 29, 2026, **FRAGOZO** told the CI that **FRAGOZO** needed to make a photocopy of the identification Elisa A.C.B. because Intermex charged back the amount of money previously transferred by **FRAGOZO** (Intermex requested **FRAGOZO** upload a copy of the Elisa A.C.B. identification to get paid). While the CI was inside of **El Kaiman**, **FRAGOZO** contacted Intermex to fix the transaction. Intermex Customer Service requested that **FRAGOZO** put Elisa A.C.B. on the phone to prove her identity. **FRAGOZO** told the Intermex operator that Elisa A.C.B. was not present, but he had possession of the identification for Elisa A.C.B. (as provided by the CI).

69. In previous undercover contacts, **FRAGOZO** had discussed obtaining a loan from the bank. I know oftentimes MSB owners obtain a loan to facilitate check cashing at their stores. The CI had previously discussed with **FRAGOZO** the possibility of loaning **FRAGOZO** money; in exchange, **FRAGOZO** would make loan repayments for the CI through wire remittances. **FRAGOZO** was reluctant to repay the CI through wire remittances because of scrutiny from the parent MSBs.

70. During the undercover contact, the CI told **FRAGOZO** he could loan him money and **FRAGOZO** could repay the loan by transmitting money to Mexico. The CI flashed **FRAGOZO** $24,000 in cash and told him about a 10% money laundering fee he could earn for transmitting the $20,000 “and this is $4,000 of the 10%, if you sent it for me.” **FRAGOZO** responded that he was scared to accept the $20,000 loan due to his bad luck “I’m scared, I’m tell you no, I don’t want, not with how’s my fucking luck.” **FRAGOZO** told the CI he would think about it today or tomorrow. During the undercover contact, **FRAGOZO** inquired with the CI about obtaining a $50,000 loan. **FRAGOZO** mentioned documenting the loan between

FRAGOZO and the CI on papers, which the CI declined to have the loan documented. **FRAGOZO** expressed concern that the parent MSBs monitor all the transactions and that it would be difficult to send the $50,000 via wire remittances.

> **FRAGOZO**: Man, they check every fucking transaction

71. During the back and forth conversation between **FRAGOZO** and the CI about the loan, the CI further informs **FRAGOZO** his monies originate from drug trafficking.

> **CI**: No, well, I've been through a lot in life, man…Look, I'm going to tell you a story. **There have been dudes I've given up to 20 kilos of cocaine too, and they have not paid me. They told me it was stolen from them.** What would you do? Just shows you how life is. And look, I gave you-and I had chances to do something, but I didn't.

72. Later in the conversation, the CI explained if he loaned **FRAGOZO** $20,000 or $50,000, the source of the money is from drugs.

> **CI**: And if, imagine if I loan you $50,000 dollars.
> **FRAGOZO**: It's different, because it'll be
> **CI**: S-same it's from the same. **It's from drugs, it's from all that I do, it's the same shit.** $1,000, $2,000, $100, $20 whatever you want, it's the same, what is the difference?
> **FRAGOZO**: Give me until 3.

73. A short time later, **FRAGOZO** informed the CI an MSB owner was arrested in Medford, Oregon for money laundering.[11]

> **FRAGOZO**: Look what's happening to those assholes. They've already busted one here, and **they busted one in Medford**. At El Rincon, I mean, I don't, and the way fucking things are, there's going to be more inspections. Those guys aren't idiots, they aren't idiots…And the ones in Medford?
> **CI**: People who have problems, man, immigration, problems about other things.
> **FRAGOZO**: **No, it was for money laundering, according to, according to them**.

[11] https://kykn.com/2026/03/18/medford-area-business-owner-accused-of-laundering-drug-money-through-wire-transfers-to-mexico/

74. A short time later, CI states again he sells drugs:

CI: You've got to know how to do things man. **I sell drugs, and I'm not worried about it. I know who I'm going to sell it to. I'm not dumb. And I know who I can give it to. I can give it to you, I trust you, you bastard.**

75. In summary, during this undercover contact, the CI and **FRAGOZO** had a lengthy discussion about a loan. The CI stated he would provide identifications and the money could be repaid in the form of wire remittances. **FRAGOZO** did not accept the $20,000 in cash as a loan from the CI nor did the **FRAGOZO** and the CI agree on a $50,000 loan from the CI. On September 29, 2026, **FRAGOZO** sent one $2,000 wire remittance using the previously provided name of Elisa A.C.B. to Honduras, which funds were represented by the CI to be drug proceeds.



(541) 726-9373
2132 MAIN ST.
SPRINGFIELD, OREGON 97477

Giro / Wire
OR-0708 - 8344
9/29/2026 10:37 AM
Procesado por / Rep: ELRAIMAN

Remitente / Sender
[redacted]
MEADOW NORTHEAST
VANCOUVER, WASHINGTON 98664
Teléfono / Phone: [redacted]

Destinatario / Recipient
[redacted]
HONDURAS

Lugar de Pago / Location of Payment
Pagador / Payer: BANCO ATLANTIDA
Ciudad / City: TEGUCIGALPA
Estado / State: FRANCISCO MORAZAN

GIRO / WIRE TRANSFER

Cantidad de Envio / Transfer Amount:	$ 2,000.00 USD
Cargos por Envio / Transf. Fees-w Cash:	$ 20.00 USD
Impuestos de Envio (Estatal) / Transfer Tax (State):	$ 0.00 USD
Impuestos de Envio (Federal) / Transfer Tax (Federal):	$ 20.00 USD
Descuento / Discount Amount:	$ 0.00 USD
Total a pagar / Total Due:	$ 2,040.00 USD

76. In total, **FRAGOZO** attempted to transmit or transmitted a total of $7,000 for the CI between May and September 2026.

F. Summary of Money Laundering Investigation

77. I believe **FRAGOZO** is involved in the laundering of illicit proceeds from Springfield, Oregon area to various drug trafficking states in Mexico and Honduras. From January 2018 through July 2026, $34,151,588.39 in wire remittances were transmitted to drug trafficking corridors in Mexico and Honduras. Furthermore, DEA investigations have identified multiple drug traffickers utilizing **El Kaiman** to transfer what appears to be drug proceeds to Honduras and drug trafficking corridors in Mexico.


78. I believe **FRAGOZO** has had significant training as it relates to anti-money laundering classes and courses for certification in order to operate as an MSB. I believe based upon undercover operations that **FRAGOZO** manipulates and/or inputs incorrect sender information to conceal and disguise the true identity of the individual (sender) as well as the source of the money originating from the sender.

F. Search Warrant Execution and Firearm Possession

79. On November 4, 2026, Investigators executed a search warrant at **FRAGOZO**'s home, at **El Kaiman** business, on **FRAGOZO**'s person, and in **FRAGOZO**'s vehicle. In the course of executing the warrant at **El Kaiman**, Investigators found bulk currency of an unknown quantity in a safe including apparent stacks of hundred-dollar bills. The currency has not yet been counted.



80. Also at **El Kaiman**, Investigators found a firearm in a cupboard below a display case. The firearm is a Ruger, model P89, 9mm caliber pistol with serial number 314-81373. The firearm was found with one magazine, was not loaded, but was accompanied by one box of 50 cartridges, 9mm caliber Herters-brand, manufactured by CCI.



81. I consulted with an interstate nexus expert with ATF who informed me that this firearm and ammunition were not manufactured in Oregon and therefore affected interstate commerce if it was received or possessed in Oregon.

82. As previously mentioned, a query with Department of Homeland Security and a review of internal law enforcement databases has determined that **FRAGOZO** appears to be a Mexican national having no immigration records associated with lawful residence or citizenship in the United States. Investigators therefore believe he is unlawfully residing in the United States and therefore an alien not permitted to possess such a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).

83. During execution of the warrants, Investigators encountered **FRAGOZO**, read him his *Miranda* rights, confirmed he understood his rights, and proceeded to interview him. **FRAGOZO** confirmed that he does not have status to be lawfully present in the United States, but he is working on obtaining status with a lawyer. He admitted that the firearm in the business was his, he knew where it was located in the business, and he purchased the firearm a couple of years ago for $300.

84. Furthermore, during the undercover contact on September 29, 2026, **FRAGOZO** *told the CI he was in possession of a firearm*. The CI explained to investigators that during the undercover contact **FRAGOZO**'s voice got very low at one point and he whispered he was in possession of a pistol and referred to the gun as "la pistola." According to the CI, as **FRAGOZO** was talking about the gun, **FRAGOZO** physically manipulated his hand in the shape of a pistol as he told the CI he was in possession of a pistol.

85. This information was shared in the context of ongoing conversations between **FRAGOZO** and the CI regarding **FRAGOZO**'s frustrations with his former business partner,

his desire to see his former business partner dead, and **FRAGOZO** exploring the possibility of hiring someone to kill his former business partner.

Conclusion

86. Based on the foregoing, I have probable cause to believe, and I do believe, that Esteban Peralta **FRAGOZO** committed violations of the Target Offenses. I therefore request that the Court issue an amended complaint and warrant authorizing the arrest of **FRAGOZO**.

87. Prior to being submitted to the Court, this affidavit and the accompanying amended complaint were all reviewed by Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) Christopher Cardani. I was informed that it is AUSA Cardani's opinion that the affidavit and application are legally and factually sufficient to establish probable cause to support the issuance of the requested amended complaint and arrest warrant.

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Request for Sealing

88. It is respectfully requested that the Court issue an order sealing, until further order of the Court, all papers submitted in support of the requested amended complaint and arrest warrant, including this affidavit. I believe that sealing these documents is necessary because the information to be seized is relevant to an ongoing investigation, and any disclosure of the information at this time may endanger the life or physical safety of an individual, cause flight from prosecution, cause destruction of or tampering with evidence, cause intimidation of potential witnesses, or otherwise seriously jeopardize an investigation. Premature disclosure of the contents of the documents may adversely affect the integrity of the investigation.

By phone pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 4.1
Scott McGeachy
Special Agent, IRS Criminal Investigation

Sworn in accordance with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 4.1 by telephone at 12:44 p.m. a.m./p.m. on November 4, 2026.

Amy E Potter
HONORABLE AMY POTTER
United States Magistrate Judge