Elected officials 'distracted' cops from public safety duties during Bite of Seattle shooting response: SPD report

A new Seattle Police Department after-action report on the deadly Bite of Seattle mass shooting found that “senior and elected officials distracted sworn staff from completing timely public safety information and on-scene decision-making,” adding another documented failure to the city's response to the July 26 attack.

The finding follows the release of internal SPD communications showing concerns among senior police leadership, officers searching for additional suspects, discussions about terrorism or gang violence, FBI involvement, and delays in briefing the public while officials waited for elected leaders.

Three people were killed, and four others were injured when gunfire erupted near the Armory at Seattle Center. According to the report, officers stationed approximately 100 feet from the gunfire responded immediately and had one shooter in custody within 20 to 30 seconds. Officers then rendered aid, secured the campus, and began evacuating thousands of attendees.

But while the report praises the immediate tactical response, it identifies significant failures in what followed. The public did not receive its first press briefing until approximately five hours after the shooting. Before the public was briefed, former Police Chief Shon Barnes held an internal SPD briefing at approximately 8:30 pm followed by a 9 pm briefing for elected officials. The first press conference did not occur until shortly before 11 pm.

The report called it a “5-hour public information gap” and separately concluded that the convergence of senior and elected officials distracted sworn personnel from providing timely public-safety information and making decisions at the scene.

Officials were preparing for a 9:45 pm media briefing, but communications showed they were waiting for elected officials. At approximately 9:57 pm, Deputy Mayor Brian Surratt wrote, “Waiting on Gov and Jayapal,” referring to Washington Gov. Bob Ferguson and Rep. Pramila Jayapal.
 

SPD was preparing for a 9:45 pm media briefing when, at 9:42 pm, Mayor Katie Wilson’s public safety director Alison Holcomb told police leadership: "Mayor's on her way. Please wait for her."

The briefing still had not happened more than half an hour later. At approximately 10:20 pm, then-Chief Shon Barnes texted SPD Chief Operating Officer Sarah Smith asking what was happening after hearing there had been no press conference. Smith replied: "They were delayed because they were waiting for the mayor to arrive."

Minutes later, Smith told Barnes there was another delay: "Sigh. Now they are waiting for the Governor to show up before they do it. So it's gonna happen, but they're still just waiting for him now." 

Additional SPD records showed that at 10:37 pm, SPD official Christopher Gregorio told Lt. Sage Farwell, “The governor is just parking and getting ready to walk in.” The briefing finally began shortly before 11 pm. Wilson later acknowledged that officials waited from approximately 9:45 until 10:45 pm for Ferguson and Jayapal before holding the news conference. 

The after-action report lists Wilson, Ferguson, Jayapal, Deputy Mayor Surratt and Seattle City Councilmember Bob Kettle among officials who were on scene at various points. Assistant Chief Tyrone Davis, who was serving as acting chief while Barnes was out of state, was also coordinating with the Mayor's Office.

The report follows texts revealing concerns from Barnes, who was away from Seattle during the shooting. “I don't know who is in charge but someone needs to assume command and slow down then follow active shooter protocols,” Barnes wrote shortly before 7 pm.

The report, however, says the formal tactical command structure on the ground functioned as designed. Lt. Farwell established the incident command before Capt. Ward arrived and assumed command, while Davis operated separately, coordinating with elected officials.

Even so, the report found incident commanders were “adversely impacted due to personnel who were not present at the scene.” It also found mutual aid should have been coordinated through the incident commander but “did not occur in some instances,” specifically citing the FBI.

Previously released texts showed officials privately considering both terrorism and gang violence while searching for another suspected shooter. One internal message described an outstanding suspect as “Maybe Arab male?” and police enlisted the FBI in the search.

Earlier records revealed another communications failure: Seattle's AlertSeattle emergency notification system was not activated during the mass shooting. A Mayor's Office message the following afternoon said officials were trying to determine why no alert had gone out. According to the message, an Office of Emergency Management duty officer contacted SPD at 7:12 pm and offered assistance but was declined.

The records also showed the Mayor's Office initially released inaccurate information saying two suspects were in custody when only one had been arrested. Surratt flagged the error and ordered the statement revised.

The after-action report recommends changing how senior and elected officials are handled during future emergencies. “Coordination of senior and elected officials needs its own staffing lane so it doesn’t pull commanders away from managing the physical scene,” the report states. SPD also recommends separating the acting chief's tactical role from Mayor's Office liaison duties and designating an on-scene public information officer with independent authority to issue public-safety alerts.

The report found additional inconsistencies, including casualty totals of seven versus eight and officer counts of 25 versus 29. It also cited staffing constraints, noting that approximately 25 to 29 officers and seven supervisors covered an event attended by thousands.

Despite those failures, the report distinguishes the performance of frontline officers from the problems that followed. Officers ran toward the gunfire, apprehended a shooter within seconds, provided lifesaving aid, and evacuated thousands without reported secondary injuries.

The report concluded that changes are needed so the rest of the department can “move with the same speed and discipline the officers on the ground already showed on July 26.”