Tennessee judge dismisses suit that would allow transgender persons to alter sex designation on birth certificate

The suit was brought challenging the Tennessee Vital Records Act of 1977, that does not allow people have their sex category changed on birth certificates.

The plaintiffs argued that the law is unconstitutional and discriminatory towards people who are transgender.

In the court filing the transgender individuals said the act of 1977 "(i) 'forc[es]' transgender persons 'to identify with a sex that was incorrectly assigned to them at birth and conflicts with who they are'; (ii) 'forces' people to disclose their transgender status, a private and sensitive matter and one which may expose them to discrimination, harassment, and violence; (iii) 'prevents transgender people from accurately expressing their gender identity'; (iv) compels transgender persons 'to endorse the government's position as to their own gender, as well as on the meaning of sex generally,' because the 'gender marker listed on Plaintiffs' birth certificates conveys the state's message that sex is determined solely by the appearance of external genitals at the time of birth and never deviates from that'; and (v) prevents [transgender persons] 'from accurately expressing their gender.'"

Kayla Gore, one of the main plaintiffs in the case, said in a statement, "Tennessee's discriminatory birth certificate policy has not only gravely impacted my life, but also presents a roadblock for all transgender Tennesseans."

Judge Eli Richardson wrote in the opinion that the birth certificate policy "does not do the crucial thing that Plaintiffs allege it does, namely, propagate incorrect representations on birth certificates of a transgender persons' true sex."

"Plaintiffs do not rely on a distinction between sex and gender identity; to the contrary, Plaintiffs go nearly so far as to say that gender identity determines sex-and then clearly rely on the notion that gender identity determines sex," Richardson continued.

Gore and the other plaintiffs in the case did not make any distinction between their perceived gender identity and biological sex as many try to do. This was a large point in the case that Richardson made.

Richardson said in the last parts of the opinion that "[p]erhaps it would be a good idea for the State to have a policy that would allow changes to birth certificates based on gender identity."

"Others might be unmoved by such concerns or may, for example, think that a birth certificate is just that-a birth certificate-and thus should reflect a designation of sex."

"But it is not for this Court to say what Tennessee's policy should be," Richardson concluded.