REVEALED: Secret Service was informed of Crooks 27 minutes before shots were fired in Butler, PA, never told Trump to get off stage

"At approximately 5:45 pm, USSS personnel were notified that local law enforcement observed a suspicious person with a rangefinder near the AGR building. By 5:52 pm, at least eight USSS personnel had been informed. Approximately two minutes before shots were fired..." the report reads.

The findings of the report list 12 key points of complete and total failure where Secret Service should have taken action to protect the president and take out the shooter and completely failed to do so, nearly costing the nation a former and perhaps future president and depriving a family of father and husband in the preventable death of Corey Comperatore.

1. "USSS personnel were notified of a suspicious person with a rangefinder around the AGR building approximately 27 minutes before the shooting," the findings in the report read.

2. "USSS was notified about an individual on the AGR roof approximately two minutes before Crooks fired from the AGR roof."

3. "Shortly before shots were fired, a USSS counter sniper saw local law enforcement running toward the AGR building with their guns drawn, but he did not alert former President Trump’s protective detail to remove him from the stage." "The USSS counter sniper told the Committee that while seeing officers with their guns drawn 'elevated' the threat level, the thought to notify someone to get Trump off the stage 'did not cross [his] mind.'"

4. "USSS counter snipers – including the one who shot and killed Crooks – were sent to the rally in response to “credible intelligence” of a threat." However, "of the USSS personnel interviewed by the committee, nearly all - said they were unaware of any credible intelligence of a threat."

5. "USSS Advance Agents for the July 13 rally denied individual responsibility for planning or security failures, deflected blame, and could not identify who had final decision authority for the rally."

6. "Local law enforcement raised concern about the security coverage of the AGR building."

7. "USSS advance personnel identified multiple line-of-sight concerns at the Butler Farm Show grounds, including the AGR building."

8. "There were two separate communications centers at the July 13 rally – one run by USSS and one by local law enforcement."

9. "Crooks was in the USSS counter sniper’s sights for “mere seconds” before he fired at Crooks."

10. "USSS Advance Agents requested additional resources that would have been helpful, but those assets were denied."

11. "USSS’ C-UAS system experienced technical problems and was inoperable until 4:33 pm, after Crooks flew his drone near the rally site."

12. "Several USSS officials reported experiencing technical problems with their radios at the rally, and told the Committee such problems are common for USSS."

"The Committee finds that USSS failures in planning, communications, security, and allocation of resources for the July 13, 2024 Butler rally were foreseeable, preventable, and directly related to the events resulting in the assassination attempt that day. The Committee also finds that siloed communications and coordination problems between federal, state, and local law enforcement officials remain unaddressed and were a contributing factor to the failures at the July 13 Butler rally," the report reads.

The Committee also cites failures in the aftermath of the assassination attempt, noting that "key requests to FBI, DHS, ATF and USSS remain outstanding. The majority of documents provided by the USSS and DHS are heavily redacted. This has unnecessarily hindered the Committee’s ability to carry out its constitutional authority to investigate and acquire information necessary to identify needed reforms. These overly burdensome redactions, including of communications related to the same individuals who the Committee interviewed, only served to delay the Committee’s ability to conduct these interviews and carry out its investigation efficiently and effectively."

The failures listed by the Committee are substantial and include failures to "clearly define responsibilities for planning and security at the July 13 rally," "to ensure the AGR building was effectively covered," "to effectively coordinate with state and local law enforcement," "to provide resources for the July 13 rally that could have enhanced security," "to communicate information about the suspicious person to key personnel," and failure "to take action to ensure the safety of former President Trump."

July 13 Report by The Post Millennial on Scribd