SCOTUS rules 9-0 straight woman can sue for discrimination after gay man took her job

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote the opinion of the court, "The question in this case is whether, to satisfy that prima facie burden, a plaintiff who is a member of a majority group must also show 'background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority,'" and that the Supreme Court holds "that this additional 'background circumstances' requirement is not consistent with Title VII’s text or our case law construing the statute. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment below and remand for application of the proper prima facie standard."

Marlean Ames, a straight woman, was hired by the Ohio Department of Youth Services in 2004 to serve as an executive secretary. She was eventually promoted to program administrator and in 2019 applied for a new management position in the office of Quality and Improvement. The role ultimately went to a lesbian woman.

Ames was removed from her role as program administrator a few days after being interviewed for the management role and accepted a demotion back to the secretarial role she had held when she first joined the agency, and a gay man was hired to fill her program administrator role. She filed a lawsuit against the agency alleging Title VII violations.

The Supreme Court ruling took up the appeal of a lower court decision that said Ames had failed to meet her burden because she had not shown "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority." The Sixth Circuit’s "background circumstances" rule "cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or our longstanding precedents. And nothing Ohio has said, in its brief or at oral argument, persuades us otherwise," Jackson wrote.

Jackson noted that Title VII’s disparate treatment provision focuses on individuals, rather than groups, and that "By establishing the same protections for every 'individual'—without regard to that individual’s membership in a minority or majority group—Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone."

"Our case law thus makes clear that the standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group," Jackson later added. "The 'background circumstances' rule flouts that basic principle."

Jackson wrote in conclusion, "The Sixth Circuit has implemented a rule that requires certain Title VII plaintiffs—those who are members of majority groups—to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard in order to carry their burden under the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework. We conclude that Title VII does not impose such a heightened standard on majority-group plaintiffs. Therefore, the judgment below is vacated, and the case is remanded for application of the proper prima facie standard."

The woman's case can now go forward without the requirement to show additional background to support her claims of discrimination.