Secret Service agent called tech support for drone equipment operation in Butler, PA ahead of Trump assassination attempt

Among the key findings was an agent inexperienced with the C-UAS drone detecting equipment having to call a toll-free tech support hotline to troubleshoot issues with the equipment. This was after a request made ahead of time for additional unmanned assets had been denied. The agent received one hour of informal training on the device itself before being tasked to operate it. Additionally, the technical difficulties resulted in the equipment not being able to be operated until after would-be assassin Thomas Crooks flew his drone, according to the interim report released by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

"Multiple foreseeable and preventable planning and operational failures by USSS contributed to [Thomas] Crooks' ability to carry out the assassination attempt of former President Trump on July 13. These included unclear roles and responsibilities, insufficient coordination with state and local law enforcement, the lack of effective communications, and inoperable C-UAS systems, among many others," the 94-page preliminary report read.

"The C-UAS system was inoperable until 4:33 pm on July 13. It was during that time that Crooks flew his drone in the vicinity of the Butler Farm Show at approximately 3:51 pm for 11 minutes while streaming footage to his controller," the report later stated, adding that if the system had been active and detected Crooks’ drone, "the C-UAS Advance Agent stated he would have sent USSS personnel to conduct a voluntary interview with Mr. Crooks to determine the purpose of his flight."

US Secret Service Chief of Communications Anthony Guglielmi responded to the findings and told Fox News the agency is determined to ensure that the events that unfolded on July 13 "never happens again."

"We have reviewed the interim report on the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump. The weight of our mission is not lost on us and in this hyperdynamic threat environment, the US Secret Service cannot fail. Many of the insights gained from the Senate report align with the findings from our mission assurance review and are essential to ensuring that what happened on July 13 never happens again," Guglielmi said.

The report also revealed that agents from Trump's security detail and the Pittsburgh field office testified they were never notified that the security room and Secret Service counter-sniper team had been told 27 minutes before the shooting that a suspicious person was detected near the building with a range finder.

"Shortly before shots were fired, a USSS counter sniper saw local law enforcement running toward the AGR building with their guns drawn, but he did not alert former President Trump's protective detail to remove him from the stage," the report revealed. "The USSS counter sniper told the committee that while seeing officers with their guns drawn 'elevated' the threat level, the thought to notify someone to get Trump off the stage 'did not cross [his] mind.'"

Days before the rally, local law enforcement expressed concerns about the AGR building, which was situated across the field from the location where Trump would take the stage. However, the rooftop of the building remained unsecured. Additional resources, such as drone apparatus and counter-assault agents to serve as liaisons with the local SWAT team, had been requested by advance agents on Trump's detail in advance. The committee found that "These requests were denied, at times without explanation."

Additionally, the committee also criticized the absence of a distinct chain of command as another significant failure. According to the report, officials who were involved in the scouting and planning for the rally "denied that they were individually responsible for planning or security failures and deflected blame."

The committee is recommending enhanced coordination and more transparent leadership, which includes the establishment of a single individual to authorize security plans, functional communication between federal agents and their local counterparts, and the allocation of additional intelligence assets and other resources.